Privacy

What Zolar can see, and what it cannot.

There is no account to create and no database of who holds what. This page is the whole list: what your browser sends, who receives it, and what each of them can read.

Last updated 25 August 2026

The short version

Your Zcash keys are created in this browser and never leave it. Zolar never asks for a name, an email address, a phone number or an identity document, and there is no Zolar account behind which any of that could sit. What does leave this browser is network traffic, and network traffic carries an IP address. Everything below is that traffic, named.

What never leaves this browser

The seed is held in local storage, encrypted, and the key that opens it is a signature from your Solana account rather than the seed itself. Nobody at Zolar can open that vault, and nobody at Zolar can reissue what is inside it.

  • The recovery phrase, and the wallet seed it produces
  • Every Zcash key derived from that seed — spending and viewing alike
  • Your notes, balances and memos. Blocks arrive the same for everybody and are trial-decrypted here, so which of them were yours is a fact this browser works out and nothing else learns
  • Your Merkle witnesses, and the witness data a proof is built from. Only the finished proof can be published, and publishing it is a decision you make

What your browser sends, and to whom

Seven hosts besides the one serving this page, and this is all of them. Every request to any of them carries your IP address, because that is what a request is. What each one can do with what arrives is where they differ, and the difference is the whole point.

  • rpc.zolar.cashZolar

    Your IP address, which ranges of the Zcash chain you ask for, and the raw bytes of any transaction you broadcast — a shield or a spend leaves through here.

    It never receives a key, a note, a balance, a memo or a witness. Blocks come back identical for every caller, so it cannot tell which of them were yours. This is not zero-trust, and calling it that would be false.

  • ledger.zolar.cashZolar

    Your IP address, an Ed25519 public key derived from your wallet seed, and rows of ciphertext with their sizes and their arrival times.

    The rows are encrypted in this browser with a key the store is never sent, so amounts, addresses and product names are unreadable to it. That public key is not your Solana account, not your Google identity and not a Zcash address, and there is no path from it back to any of them.

  • auth.privy.ioPrivy, a third party

    Only if you sign in: your Google identity, and the embedded Solana wallet created for you on first sign-in.

    Your Zcash keys are not derived by Privy, not stored by Privy, and never sent to it. Zolar never receives your Google password and never asks for one.

  • solana-rpc.publicnode.comPublicNode, a third party

    Your IP address and the Solana account being asked about — a balance lookup names the address it is looking up.

    Nothing from the Zcash side reaches it. It is a public endpoint answering a public question about a public ledger.

  • hermes.pyth.networkPyth, a third party

    Your IP address, and that somebody wants the ZEC price.

    The request carries no amount, no address and no account. It is the same request for everybody who opens the page.

  • a connectivity provider's hostthe connectivity provider, a third party

    Only if you buy a plan: your IP address, which plan you bought, and the payment status of that order. The payment page is on a host the provider names.

    No name, no email address, no phone number and no identity document is asked for or sent. The product was chosen partly because it has never needed one.

  • www.googletagmanager.comGoogle Analytics

    Your IP address and which page you opened, on the production site only.

    No custom event is sent, and no wallet address, account identifier, balance or amount is ever passed to it.

Server logs

The two Zolar hosts sit behind an ordinary web server writing ordinary access logs: IP address, time, path, user agent. They rotate and are overwritten. They are not joined to a wallet, an account, an address or a purchase — and there is little in them that could be, because a request to rpc.zolar.cash for a range of blocks is the same request whoever makes it.

Signing in is optional, and it attaches a name

Signing in belongs to the Solana half of Zolar and to nothing else; the Zcash wallet runs without it. Sign in with Google and that identity is attached to the Solana account your attestations sit on — and that account is public by design, because an attestation is meant to be read. Your Zcash address, notes, amounts and witnesses are not exposed by it, but the account holding the claim is no longer anonymous.

  • Signing in with a Solana wallet you already hold avoids this entirely, and that is why the option is there
  • Privy holds the identity and the embedded wallet. What they keep, and for how long, is governed by their policy rather than this one
  • You can sign out whenever you like. The Zcash wallet in this browser is untouched by it

Your activity history

History survives a change of device without a login being stored anywhere, and the way it does that is the privacy property worth explaining. The account is an Ed25519 public key pulled from your wallet seed, so the same phrase reaches the same history on any device with nothing registered in between. The key is the account: there is no row joining a public identity to shielded funds, because a table like that is a list of who holds Zcash.

  • Every figure, address and product name in a row is encrypted in this browser before it is sent
  • What the store can see is metadata: how many rows, how large, and when each arrived
  • Nothing is stored to reach it. Both keys are re-derived from the seed each session and held in memory only
  • The history can be erased from the store on request from the app, and erasing it does not touch either chain

Analytics

Google Analytics runs on the production site and nowhere else — not on a developer's machine, not in the screenshot tooling — and it records page views. It sets Google's own identifiers in this browser. A content blocker or Google's opt-out add-on stops it, and nothing on this site depends on it running.

What is stored on this device

All of it lives in this browser's local storage, under this site's origin, unreadable by any other site. Clearing site data deletes every part of it — including the vault, which is the only copy of your seed unless you exported the phrase. Nobody can restore that for you.

  • The encrypted seed vault, and whether you have downloaded your recovery phrase
  • Sync progress, which is why a second sync takes seconds rather than an hour
  • A cached copy of your activity history
  • A cached witness tree, so building a proof does not rescan the chain

What Zolar never asks for

No name, no postal address, no date of birth, no phone number, no identity document and no proof of address. There is no KYC step anywhere in this product. Nothing about you is collected in order to run a wallet, because nothing about you is needed to run one.

What cannot be deleted

Zcash and Solana are public ledgers and Zolar operates neither. A transaction you broadcast is permanent and out of everybody's reach, including yours and including Zolar's. A shielded Zcash transaction reveals no sender, no recipient and no amount — but it exists, and it exists forever. An attestation published to Solana is public by design. Erasing your history in Zolar removes Zolar's copy of a record; it does not and cannot unmake what is on a chain.

Changes

This page changes when the software does, and the date above says when it last did. The host list is the part most likely to move. It is written to be checked against what the app actually requests rather than trusted, and the source is public so that checking it is possible.

Contact

Questions about anything on this page, or a request to erase what the history store holds for you, go to privacy@zolar.cash.